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Background: Mankind is highly dependent upon fossil fuels for its ever-increasing energy demands. The future
supply is unreliable mainly due to the fact that it is a finite resource which is becoming more and more expensive
to produce. As a reaction to this current threat and uncertainty, a mathematical model is developed in this study in
order to identify more sustainable quantities. The main objective of this study was to provide companies with a tool
to assist in the prevention of overproduction, in other words, to minimize unsalable production quantities and to
preserve natural resources.
Method: Regression analysis, game theory - Cournot game.
Results: The study was carried out in cooperation with the Italian company PintInox, S. p. A., located in the Italian
region of Lombardia. After the implementation of sustainability measurement metrics into the company's processes
and the discovery of a profitable market niche (market principles applying value to sustainable development) for
PintInox, S. p. A., a natural grouping (oligopoly) of Italian cutlery producers was identified. Entrance barriers posed
by this group (oligopoly) are all kinds of inabilities to prove a verifiable concept of their Corporate Social Responsibility
practices. Companies that failed to communicate their commitment regarding sustainable development to their
business-to-business (B2B) partners cannot enter this oligopoly and are, consequently, excluded from markets placing
value on sustainability principles. Based on economic effectiveness, the marketable output of every oligopoly member
was calculated.
Conclusions: The desire to preserve natural resources is driven by incentives within the marketplace. These incentives
were identified through the game theory. The companies firstly concentrate themselves on social responsibility and
environmental safety and then, as oligopoly members, on economic effectiveness. The study reconfirms that also the
economic dimension plays an important role in a ‘triple bottom line’ philosophy.
Keywords: Oligopoly; Cournot game; Game theory; Corporate Social ResponsibilityBackground
Introduction
This paper has an ambition to fill the gap in research
activities in regard to sustainable development. Many
studies in this field contain an economic dimension. Just to
mention some of the institutions and their contributions:
the Institute for Environmental Decisions from Zurich
dealt with the topic ‘Economic and environmental benefits
of dry discharge of bottom ash and acid washing of fly ash
from municipal solid waste incineration in Switzerland’,
the Department of Energy Engineering from The UniversityCorrespondence: martin.dolinsky@sustainability.sk
Department of Management and Marketing, Faculty of Economics and
Business, Pan-European University, Tematinska 10, 85105 Bratislava, Slovakia
© 2015 Dolinsky; licensee Springer. This is an O
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.or
in any medium, provided the original work is pof Florence worked on the ‘Economic Assessment of
Innovative Processes for Biomethane Production’, the
Faculty of Civil Engineering and Geosciences from
The Delft University of Technology on the ‘Economic
and Carbon Footprint Evaluation of Thin Stillage
Treatment’, CIRSEE Suez Environnement on the
‘Technical and Economic Assessment of Micro-cogeneration
Technologies for Sewage Biogas’, and the Deutsches
Biomasseforschungszentrum (gemeinnützige GmbH) from
Leipzig on the ‘Environmental Impacts and Economic
Feasibility of Producing Bioenergy under Various Frame
Conditions’ [1]. All the mentioned studies containedpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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the integrative assessments was the selection of the most
feasible investment strategy, whilst classical financial
indicators were used to determine the economic feasibility
(e.g., simple cost analyses, net present value analyses,
payback period anticipation, capital expenditure analyses).
However, none of them paid scientific attention to a
rigorous analysis of the real market situation. Economic
issues were considered only from the company's perspec-
tive, and the market perspective was neglected. In spite of
this, we can find only a few contributions studying the
market situation and solving different problems in a
manner which is attempted in this paper. The paper
‘Environmental innovation under Cournot competition’
from June 2007 contains a unique market approach.
According to the comments of the authors who presented
this paper, contrary to the existing literature, a market
approach was used in modeling the interaction between
the output market, where companies play á la Cournot,
and the emission permit market [2]. The authors make
mention that besides their contribution, only Montero's
article takes into account a strategic interaction in the
output market [3]. Sanin and Zanaj correlate output
market revenues and revenues or costs from trading
in the permit market. This paper, in contrary, exam-
ines the total costs of the production and revenues
from selling in a market evaluating the triple bottom
line of sustainability. In this paper, a concrete case of
the potential success/failure of a business strategy oriented
on sustainable development is investigated under market
conditions.
The role of a game theory in sustainability
Mathematical models can help preserve the Earth's re-
sources. A game theory (i.e., an interactive decision theory)
can play an important role in the preservation of energy
resources - through its ability to identify the salable
quantities and consequently minimize energy consump-
tion. Today, fossil resources are not considered to be a
perspective natural resource for a sustainable future. On
the one hand, there are countries that are prominent users
of oil, such as the USA, becoming almost net exporters of
oil; but what is the price paid for the self-sufficiency in
strategic commodities? Energy Return on Investment
(EROI) would be a partial answer to this question.
During the 1950s in the USA, every barrel of oil
invested in exploration had led to the discovery of
about 50 or more, and in 1990, a ratio of one to five
[4]. In other words, different deposits are characterized by
different cost levels of production. We are depleting the
most accessible supplies first and then investing more and
more energy into the extraction of less accessible re-
sources. This paper offers a solution of how to circumvent
the problem of the scarcity of resources by providingcompanies with guidance on how to better match the
production setup to the customer's needs - this is
precisely the role that the game theory can play in
sustainable development. An application of the game
theory (Cournot game) would lead to less energy re-
sources being consumed since it would help a com-
pany to better prevent excessive (not needed)
production. Our solution is economically driven -
based on the presumption that companies will always
want to lower production costs by consuming less
raw material. ‘One (opinion) group argues from an
economic point of view with the goal of breaking the
dependency on a feedstock that is becoming scarcer and
more contentious’. This economic view is presented by
Sandholzer and Narodoslawsky in the literature [5]. In
general, it is also cost-effectiveness (not solely altruism)
which drives companies to optimize their setup of
production under the requirements of sustainable
development. Environmental economists are now solving
the question - how large, in its physical dimensions, should
the economic system be in relation to the ecosystem that
sustains it [4]? To answer this question, one has to link
together economic and ecological indicators, and that is
also the focus of this paper.
The role of an ecological footprint in the relationship
between economics and ecology
In order to be able to create a link between economic
activities and their environmental impact, we need an
appropriate indicator. Our research outcomes were tested
along with the management of an Italian small- and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) PintInox, S. p. A. For as-
sessment purposes, we were searching for an indicator
which would have a user friendly format and which would
enable us to implement a life cycle assessment. After con-
sultation with the management of PintInox, S. p. A., we
decided to use the ecological footprint. The latter is also
available in the form of an easily accessible web-based
tool, and an Austrian version of the ecological footprint
was available through the university, which has made the
tool reliable. The ecological footprint relates economic/
business activities to the ecosystem by offering the possi-
bility to convert economic dimensions into environmental
dimensions. The maximum capacity of our ecosystem is
represented by the surface area of our planet Earth. The
anthropogenic impact (represented by economic activities)
on the environment which is measured and trans-
ferred into square meter of earth surface cannot
exceed the area of planet Earth. Otherwise, the anthropo-
genic activities cannot be considered sustainable.
Obviously, a single small- or medium-sized enterprise
cannot track the ecological footprint of all companies
in the world and, based on this information, derive
its own allowable output in square meter. Today,





S ≤ Splanet ð1Þ




S is the surface occupied by other entities
in the economy, and Splanet is the total surface of planet
Earth.
Consequently, the only strategic move a company can
effectively make on its own initiative is to declare a real
(measurable) commitment to the environment and society.
One of the best solutions is to work out a policy or
a strategy which will effectively reduce the negative
environmental impact.
The uniqueness of the proposed method
The main goal of the presented initiative is to help SMEs
to apply sustainability measurement metrics in a manner
that will not jeopardize their ability to successfully compete
in the market (it should even boost their ability to compete
rather than jeopardize it). The paper presents a concept of
sustainability implementation by respecting the business
limitations (e.g., the economic effectiveness). Companies
can accept a philosophy of sustainable development only
to an extent which will not endanger their ability to com-
pete in the marketplace. The principle is not to insist on
compulsory levels of rescued square meter of earth surface
but to take into account an environmental dimension in a
way that managers would voluntarily lower the environ-
mental impact in cases when it is economically feasible
(i.e., the preference of a market-based approach to a com-
mand-and-control approach). In other words, this paper
offers a methodology that companies can employ to boost
their competitiveness by realizing sustainability-friendly
decisions. There must be a number of market incentives
which support the evolution of verifiable Corporate Social
Responsibility as a functional concept. If we want to make
our planet habitable in the future, we must find ap-
proaches to realize sustainable development. The aim is to
implement new principles within the boundaries of those
impacting the environment most - the SMEs (the SMEs
contribute an amount of at least 70% of industry-related
environmental damage due to the fact that the damage is
caused by 99% of all companies in Europe [6]). However,
this would not be possible without respecting their pri-
mary objective, which is in general to remain competitive.
These seem to be contradictory goals - to help SMEs to
implement climate-friendly processes whilst not jeopardiz-
ing their ability to remain competitive. The resolution of
this situation lies in the successful implementation ofsustainable development principles in the form of a well-
targeted and well-performed business strategy. In other
words, the implementation of an innovation lowering en-
vironmental impact will come at a cost, but if customers
are willing to pay for that, then it would be a win-win
situation for a company and society. The key to a success-
ful implementation of verifiable and trustworthy sustain-
able measurement metrics is the consecutive successful
commercialization of the results of this activity.
Markets placing value on sustainable development
One of the main characteristics of every business is the
natural willingness of every company to remain competi-
tive. Another important feature is that an innovation must
be marketable, as seen from a business perspective. Other-
wise, it would be easily forgotten. Taking these into con-
sideration, this paper strongly concerns itself with the new
thriving market which places value on sustainability prin-
ciples - customers expect responsible behavior from com-
panies and buyers, whereas the latter require responsible
behavior from their suppliers and push in this way the re-
sponsible entities directly into the acceptance of the sus-
tainable development philosophy. For example, a large
company such as the ACCOR hotel chain could have de-
cided to choose only the threshold suppliers. It would
therefore not be possible for the company to exceed this
threshold with any other products. The threshold could
be measured using ecological footprints. Products ex-
ceeding the maximum footprint would not be procured by
such a large company. This could be one of the ways in
which barriers to entering a market principle, applying
value to sustainable development for SMEs characterized
by their low environmental performance, could be over-
come. Other authors also mention the role of markets in
the dissemination of sustainable development principles:
 Local markets for combustible waste in Europe are
gradually opening up, and a liberalization of trade in
products, such as paper and plastics, has created a
thriving international market that valorizes
secondary resources and improves the treatment
efficiency [7];
 Life cycle assessment has become an important issue
for products and services, since environmental concerns
become increasingly decisive for the admission to
markets as well as customer's decisions [5].
Implementation in SMEs
This paper was prepared in cooperation with PintInox,
S. p. A., an Italian SME. Small- and medium-sized enter-
prises are the key element in decarbonizing the economy.
Those SMEs employ 66.9% of the European labor force and
form 58.4% of the total Gross Value Added produced by
private businesses in the EU in 2010 [8]. The cooperation
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dates back to 2011, when the initial parts of the assess-
ments were carried out. The selected geographical field of
research was Northern Italy. This paper focusses on the
implementation phase of an innovative and sustainable
product. Figure 1 depicts the life cycle of this product. In a
time period from 2011 to 2012, we performed pioneering
sustainability measurements of the internal processes in the
company. We were then able to create a knowledge base
used for the elaboration of a pioneering Corporate Social
Responsibility concept based on the existing efforts leading
towards sustainability. In our work, we discovered eco-
innovations that had already been realized and that had not
yet been labeled with an ecological label, because the com-
pany management did not have the relevant metrics which
provided the evidence of sustainability. By the identification
of already elaborated environmental innovation, we realized
that one of the traditional managerial beliefs, stating that an
orientation on sustainable development is undoubtedly a
money-consuming activity requiring additional invest-
ments, did not hold true. Figure 2 illustrates an example of
our assessment results. The company produced their model
Sirio in 1987 with successive innovations in the design real-
ized in 1991 and 2004. Those innovations were responsible
for savings in the raw material used, and therefore, calcu-
lated by using the ecological footprint, 9 m2 of earth surface
was rescued per one item produced. This is a result
that could be compared with the threshold set up by a
large company (i.e., a potential buyer of an ‘eco-innovated
product’). Provided the savings in footprint were enough/
satisfactory for a buyer, then the ‘sustainability market
entrance barrier’ could be overcome.
The aim of this paper is not only to describe the
pioneering sustainability assessment processes for a
selected company but also to fill the gap in sustainability
assessments in terms of integrative assessment processes.
An integration of technical (e.g., footprint) and economicFigure 1 Critical point of life cycle - analysis of market penetration.assessments (e.g., game theory) is needed but has been
sporadic until now. In other words, companies need to
think holistically in realizing eco-innovation. The holistic
view has to be incorporated in the assessment of the
ecological and social performance of a concrete sustainable
idea (to prove and to verify that it is really a sustainable
solution) along with the assessment of the economic feasi-
bility of this sustainable idea under real market conditions.
Sustainability initiatives strive for commercialization;
otherwise, the philosophy of ‘being sustainable’ and
‘behaving responsibly’ can hardly be widespread. This
study is devoted to an analysis of the market because
selling to the end customer is the most critical phase
of a product's life cycle, determining its success or failure.
In Figure 1, the most critical point in a life cycle (the
market penetration), determining the success or failure of
a concept, is presented.
The aims of the study
The broader aim of this study was to describe the steps
necessary to analyze whether the sustainable idea (e.g.,
environmental innovation) is environmentally compatible,
socially acceptable, and economically viable. In simple
words, we have searched for a viable business solution redu-
cing the negative anthropogenic impact. In our opinion, the
most important steps are the specification of the sus-
tainability measurement metrics to be used drawing
attention to the fact that the implementation of these
metrics cannot endanger the competitiveness of compan-
ies applying them. The specific research aims of the study
were as follows:
(1) Within the life cycle of a product, the specific aim
in terms of the market penetration phase is to
analyze the potential success of a product at markets
assigning value to principles of sustainable
development (markets based on sustainability);
Figure 2 Environmental innovation discovered for a production plant.
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companies how they can commercialize their newly
introduced concepts of Corporate Social
Responsibility; and
(3) to present a methodology that other companies can
use in order to predict their potential success using
market principles based on sustainable development.
Methods
Game theory in general
The game theory (interactive decision theory) is a key
tool used in this study as a part of the implementation
of sustainability measures in business. It is a rational
interaction of counterparts (labeled by the game as
players). In business-to-business (B2B) relations, there
are numerous interactive situations that can be analyzed
by the game theory. In our case, the game theory is
utilizable in the identification of the behavior of smaller
business entities in relation to large companies (B2B
customers) that already have a significant interest in
sustainability. The interest of large companies in sustain-
ability is derived from their understanding of this concept
as a marketing advantage (when applied as a differentiation
strategy) or, in some cases, as an incentive to preserve
material and energy resources (economy and ecology are
sometimes in symbiosis - they both want to ‘consume less’).
Large companies, after establishing their own internal
environmental certification, ‘prescribe’ social responsibility
to their suppliers (e.g., the obligation posed to supplier
SME to deliver life cycle assessment information about
supplied products, the obligation to prove a functional
Corporate Social Responsibility policy using verifiable
metrics). It is generally agreed that the first formal
theorem in the theory of games was proven by E. Zermelo
in an article on chess that appeared in German in 1913a.
However, a game theory contains several of topics
(monopolies, law of demand, competition) that existed
independently of the game theorya itself. Today's Cournot
game principles were brought to the forefront by AntoineAugustin Cournot in 1838 in the book ‘Recherches sur les
principles mathématiques de la théorie des richesses’ (who
studied the mathematical principles of the theory of
wealth) but have not referred to the game theory rules
since that timeb. This means that the principles did not
exist in the form that we know them today. To summarize
briefly, the very first time when an interactive decision
theory was professionally used and labeled as a game was
in the relation to saloon games and is dated back to the
year 1913. Today, the game theory is being used in
economics, political science, military strategic and tactical
decisions, computer science, evolutionary biology, and
a more recent field of application - the sustainable
development. The game theory analyzes behavior and
interaction of economic agents. To date, 15 scientists
have been awarded The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their
work, which either directly or indirectly contained game
theory principles (very recent laureate dealing with the
game theory is Jean Tirole, for the year 2014). The 2012
laureates, Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley, have also
studied how societies allocate resourcesc.
Game theory application
Promising markets placing value on sustainability already
exist. Such markets are not being created by governmental
regulations but by large companies themselves. This
situation is being partially triggered by ISO 14 040,
which requires companies to proceed with life cycle
assessment. Large companies are therefore requiring
their suppliers to deliver information about the previous
phases of the life cycle. This interaction between large
companies and their suppliers is responsible for the
creation of a new market applying value to sustainability.
The following sections of the paper contain the interac-
tions of competitors of these types of promising markets.
The Cournot game is being used for the analysis of this
interaction. The following sections also describe the
entrance barriers that this new market type typically lays
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sibility policy. The game theory in this paper analyzes
the market situation being created by a supply chain suc-
cessor - the Accor hotel chain (a traditional B2B customer
of cutlery producers) and the competitive response of cut-
lery producers willing to penetrate the market created by
the Accor hotel chain by meeting the sustainability criteria
being set by the Accor hotel chain to be met by its
suppliers. The game theory is here in a position to
drive the SMEs towards sustainability.
Orientation on sustainability as a source of competitive
advantage
Due to disparities between Italian labor standards and
Asian labor standards, an Italian company will never be
able to match Asian cost-effectiveness. In the opinion of
Italian managers, the scarce concern for health and
safety rules and precarious employment makes some
Asian companies more cost-effective in comparison to
Italian companies. Italian companies have optimized
their production automation and employ the minimum
workforce required. However, with other factors (e.g.,
material effectiveness, pace of production, high-
innovation potential), the director of marketing con-
siders their ability to realize a cost leadership strategy as
very limited. After cooperation in a field of implementa-
tion of sustainable practices, he believes that a sustain-
able development philosophy is one of the very few
possibilities to successfully remain competitive with
cheaper Asian companies. The emergence of thriving
markets placing value on triple bottom line principles
means that there is a market space which cannot be en-
tered by companies with low social and environmental
performance. This paper introduces the Cournot game
theory as a tool enabling companies to analyze their po-
tential to succeed in these new markets. Large compan-
ies with their environmental obligations posed to their
suppliers are direct creators of such markets. Those sup-
pliers unable to meet the prescribed environmental stan-
dards are automatically deterred from this market
assigning value to principles of sustainable development.
In other words, environmental standards are considered
as entrance barriers for competitors with low social and
environmental performance. For example, a footprint
threshold set up for supplier's products could be one of
the measurable and clear entrance barriers.
Introduction to a Cournot game
In terms of comparability of environmental and social
performance of entities (e.g., companies, municipalities,
departments), standardized indicators are necessary. The
negative side of standardization is the reductionism, the
loss of certain dimension. In our opinion, there is a unique
value mind-set behind all sustainability measurementmetrics, and this mind-set is expressed in the willingness
to prioritize things and to compare them. The game
theory applied within the sustainable development field
cannot have an ambition to measure environmental
impact, but its role is to help identify the best economic
decisions that will lead companies to the new type of
market, giving them information about their potential
success/failure in the market. Economic advice given by
the game theory is as follows:
 How costly, in terms of economic effectiveness,
should the pioneering sustainable steps be;
 how much should a company ideally invest into
eco-innovations;
 how much the ideal technology, ensuring the
presence in the new type of market, could cost; and
 what is the ideal bulk of production?
In this paper, we decided to use the game theory as one of
the assessment tools that are usually categorized as sustain-
ability measurement metrics. Using the Cournot game the-
ory, we are capable of thinking in another dimension - the
dimension of competitiveness. Using a system of equations
(polynomial equations of the second degree), we can shift
from the cost dimension to the competitiveness dimension.
In the course of the identification of the competitiveness of
a product, which went through an eco-innovation process,
we firstly observe the total costs of a production (including
labor costs and overheads). In general, we need to make this
observation in every company which would like to enter a
market value on principles of sustainable development. The
other data needed represent the market space to be served.
To derive a demand function, we need to know the required
amount of products and prices a buyer will accept. Using
linear regression splines, we derive at the cost function of
every competitor willing to enter the market. Profit
functions, derived from demand and cost functions,
represent payoff functions. First-order conditions for the
maximization of the profit of each company lead to a sys-
tem of linear equations. Solving the system of equations will
underscore companies with positive and negative outputs
(produced amounts of eco-friendly products). An economic
interpretation of a negative output is zero production - such
a company will have failed to deliver its eco-products to the
market. To correctly complete this mathematical analysis,
additional verifications are inevitable - after a second-order
condition test, we define intervals of feasible outputs
because we exclude intervals of outputs for which cost func-
tions do not have an economic interpretation.
Demand function derivation
The main purpose of the Cournot game was in our case
to identify how successful a company would be under
real market conditions. The market actors are as follows:
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 Other SME competitors of PintInox, S. p. A., with
an adequately elaborated Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) policy; and
 Large companies in the role of buyers (B2B
partners, market creators) from PintInox, S. p. A.,
and other competing SMEs.
This new type of market is only accessible for companies
with verifiable economic, social, and ecological performance
and with a reliable orientation towards sustainable develop-
ment. As we have already mentioned, the decision as to
which competitors are admitted to the market should be
made by the demand creator - the large company in this
case. In the game á la Cournot, the company's strategies are
quantified. The companies simultaneously choose their
respective output levels qi from feasible sets Qi = [0,x) [9].
They sell their output at a market-clearing price p(q), where
q = q1 + q2 +… + qn. The company's total profit is then
generally expressed by an Equation 2 and Cournot reac-
tion functions specifying each company's optimal output
for each fixed output level of every opponent in the game
((3) and (4)).
ui q1; q2ð Þ ¼ qip qð Þ−ci qið Þ ð2Þ
ri : Q−i→Qi ð3Þ
rj : Q−j→Qj ð4Þ
where ci : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is company i's cost function and
Q−i is the sum of the outputs of all the members of the
oligopoly except competitor i. PintInox, S. p. A., is in
our game with its competitors from Italy. Asian low-cost
competitors were not able to enter this market due to
their inability to come up with a functional and verifiable
Corporate Social Responsibility policy - which enables com-
panies in Italy to create a natural oligopoly composed of
Italian companies. Large companies (e.g., the ACCOR hotel
chain, COOP Italia) have set environmental rules for their
supplier SMEs. Such rules are in the form of an internal
environmental policy and set requirements for SMEs (SMEs
are considered as potential business partners):
 The ACCOR hotel chain (‘Planet 21 certification’) -
involves partners in the sustainable development
strategy and integrates them into a responsibility
process. Purchasing contracts have to be in
compliance with ‘Procurement charter 21’;
 COOP Italia (‘10 principles of COOP environmental
policy’) - requires a reduction in transportation
distance, a better utilization of raw materials, and
the tracking of the environmental impact of the
production process happening on the suppliers'
production site and involves the education of
business partners.In our investigated case, non-compliance with the
sustainability requirements posed by large companies
automatically repelled the SMEs (suppliers) from business
deals with a large company. Decisions regarding who
would be admitted and which cooperation would be
terminated were based on the actual measured environ-
mental and social performance. Based on the delivery of
the required sustainability measurement metrics results,
the first pre-selection of SMEs is carried out. A natural
oligopoly of SMEs fulfilling the requirements in the
application of sustainability measurement metrics is
created during this step. Since the triple bottom line of
sustainability is composed of three equal dimensions, in
the second step of the market selection, the economic
dimension plays its role. In this paper, the Cournot game
forms the economic part of sustainability measurement
metrics and can be considered as a complex economic
indicator. Based on economic effectiveness, the Cournot
game defines a market space every competitor in a formed
natural oligopoly is able to fulfill. The Cournot game is in
this paper presented as an internal part of sustainability
measurement metrics. For the explanation of natural
oligopoly, this paper uses a definition provided by M.
Horniaček, as it allows companies in the industry to have
different cost functions - which will likely be true for our
case. The definition of a natural oligopoly in a single
product industry is as follows ((5) and (6)) [10]:
Let m be the number of types of products considered
in the model, J(k) the set of companies capable of produ-
cing type k ∈ {1,…,m} of product, Yj = [0, χj] the set of
feasible output levels of the company j ∈ J(k), and χj the
maximal feasible output of the company j; we can define
a natural oligopoly as follows:
Considering k ∈ {1,…,m} and output Qk ∈ (0, ∑j ∈ J(k)Xj],
a set of companies J(k) *⊆J(k) with # (J(k) *) ≥ 2 is a natural
oligopoly in the industry producing type k of a product
with an output level Qk provided there exists an output
vector y(k) * ∈ ∏j ∈ J(k) * Yj such that
X
j∈J





















The market demand is being represented by the Accor
hotel chain and is geographically limited to Italy. Hotel
chains are typical B2B customer of PintInox, S. p. A.,
and its competitors. The demand is being represented
by 65 hotels residing in Italy and belonging to the Accor
chain (Mercure, Sofitel, Ibis, Novotel). We assume one
Table 1 Prescribed minimum monthly salary levels
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(a fork in this case) per one hotel guest. We have presumed
the full utilization of the hotel capacities, i.e., the maximum
allowed amount of guests in a hotel room (standard or fam-
ily rooms). The total demand for Italy is then 8,766 forks.
We have considered only hotels with internal certification
‘Planet 21’ because this form of standardization is the key
element in setting up sustainability boundaries. A hotel
which possesses this certification (assigned by Accor
headquarters) should track the origin of raw and auxiliary
materials being used during the previous phases of a life
cycle of products and being purchased by the hotel
management. As we have already mentioned, hotel chains
are one of the traditional B2B customers of cutlery
producers, and in this case, the Accor is a direct creator of
a market based on sustainability principles. This mar-
ket is closed for competitors with weak environmental
performance, as cost-effectiveness itself does not represent
a competitive advantage here. After the selection of a price
from the catalogue and the discussion with the manage-
ment about the potential demand referring to the modeled
price, we set up an inverse demand function (8) from the
demand function (7). The coefficients of the function were
obtained using regression analysis.
Qd ¼ 8; 787−104P ð7Þ
P ¼ 84:5−0:009Q ¼ 84:5−0:009 q1 þ q2… þ qnð Þ
ð8Þ
Cost function derivation
We started our game with 11 eco-friendly and respon-
sible players. We identified 10 direct competitors of
PintInox, S. p. A. in Italy; however, we did not go into
further specifications of each of them, since we did not
have direct access to their facilities. We assumed their
levels of production costs as similar to those of PintInox,
S. p. A. In this industry, every company has detailed
knowledge about technology variations typical for cut-
lery production and their related costs. In the sample of
10 companies, we compare various cost levels of the
production of an identical product (a model Sirio produced
by PintInox, S. p. A., and related substitutes made by
different companies). Small differences in the technology
used were expressed by the pace of production. The
higher the time donation to produce one product (a fork),
the less innovative technology was used. The cost func-
tions we derived for every company in a game are based
on 30 observations occurring during 1 week. In PintInox,
S. p. A., we observed a production process of a model
Sirio (fork) during 1 week. We took into consideration
fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs: Total production costs of a shearing
form used in the cutting process to cut the exact
shape of a fork;
 Variable costs: Salaries and wages, material costs,
and other types of costs influenced by a change in
the amount of production.
There are many more obligations that PintInox, S. p.
A., has to fulfill on a periodic basis in comparison with
the cheap Asian producers (e.g., prescribed probation
period, equal opportunities, compulsory content of labor
agreement, classification of work types in the metal
industry and related remuneration). The variability of costs
in our game was influenced by the employee operating the
machine during our observation. During 1 week, four
employees belonging to a different category each (based on
the character of duties, difficulty, and work experience)
were rotated at the observed workplace. The monthly
salary levels in effect from the 1st of January 2012 are
depicted in Table 1. Using linear regression splines, we
derived a cost function for PintInox, S. p. A., and for the 10
Italian competitors. In the dataset, there are three samples
for every competitor - total costs (TC), amounts produced
(qn), and amounts produced squared (qn
2). The size of each
sample is represented by the number of observations - 30.
We employed a technique known as ‘curvilinear regression
analysis’. The data was fitted to the model using polyno-
mial regression, and a polynomial equation of the second
degree was derived. In order to explain this situation, we
have to delve deeper into this analysis and to firstly explain
the use of degrees of freedom, as it is important for
the t-statistic. The degrees of freedom are given by the
number of observations minus the number of coefficients
in the fitted regression model [11]. According to the lec-
ture material of the University of Iowa, for a quadratic
curve model, this gives n-3 since we are fitting two slopes
and one interceptd. Having 27 degrees of freedom, the
critical value for t_.025 one-tailed and t_0.05 two-tailed is
2.052. Using the critical value approach, we computed
t = −1.495 [(coefficient − 1)/standard error]. So, for a
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at a level of .05 since t = | − 1.495| < 2.052. For a
quadratic coefficient, we do not reject a null hypothesis at
a level .05 since t = | − 0.99| < 2.052. From the statistical
point of view, we are not able to confirm causality
between the level of output and total costs in PintInox, S.
p. A. In the case of the competitor's data, there are two
competitors of 10, where we are not able to reject the H0
hypothesis. This does not mean, we have to accept H0.
The data from the regression analysis are used in the
Cournot game, which represents the sustainability
decision support tool. The data feed will be realized by
companies, and the decision will be theirs as to what kind
of ‘typology’ of competitors they will choose; they may
create various scenarios based on different cost levels of
production. The data in our case are from the actual
production plant and were confirmed by the management
of the cooperating company. The competitor's data were
also confirmed as one possible scenario. Therefore, we
consider them relevant and trustworthy. The computed
cost functions based on regression analysis are as follows:
0:0055q21−3:5306q1 þ 5; 562 Pintlnox ð9Þ
−0:0408q22−19:78q2 þ 4; 184 Competitorx2 ð10Þ
0:0007q23−1:08q3 þ 5; 573 Competitorx3 ð11Þ
−0:0017q24 þ 4:02q4 þ 5; 096 Competitor x4 ð12Þ
−0:0130q25 þ 7:43q5 þ 4; 567 Competitor x5 ð13Þ
−0:0056q26 þ 8:42q6 þ 4; 402 Competitor x6 ð14Þ
−0:0075q27 þ 10:49q7 þ 4; 540 Competitorx7 ð15Þ
−0:0241q28 þ 22:7q8 þ 3; 951 Competitor x8 ð16Þ
−0:0031q29 þ 6:55q9 þ 4; 818 Competitor x9 ð17Þ
0:0021q210 þ 0:61q10 þ 5; 681 Competitorx10 ð18Þ
0:0088q211 þ 0:002q11 þ 4; 930 Competitorx11 ð19Þ
Regression analysis based on the data from PintInox, S.
p. A. is available in the Additional file 1; regressionFigure 3 Total initial demand versus real satisfied demand.analysis based on the data from competitors is available in
the Additional file 2. Initial demand function is available
in the Additional file 3, and residual demand function is
available in the Additional file 4. Additional file 5 contains
geographical distribution of hotels in Italy that were con-
sidered for derivation of demand functions. The detailed
calculation description is available in the Additional file 6.
Results and discussion
This paper has reconfirmed that for companies excluded
from the Cournot game due to zero production levels or
those which have not conformed to the second-order
condition, it is not in their interest to reenter the Cournot
game. The Cournot game's results have actually shown
the optimal output for each fixed output level of every
opponent in the game of companies.
In Figure 3, we can see the overall satisfaction of the
market demand, represented by sold quantities of every
competitor. For a better recognition, the sold quantities
are available in Table 2. From 11 competitors that
adhere to the principles of sustainable development, only
six were able to enter the market based on the triple
bottom line of sustainability. The reason for not entering
was at this time the insufficient economic effectiveness
(despite the fact that the environmental performance of
these competitors was acceptable). The Cournot game
helps companies to obtain a picture of their competitive-
ness and abilities to place a certain amount of environ-
mentally friendly production within the market. The
game should be in a reality based on the collections of
data (production costs) mutually exchanged by economic
departments of competing companies. The English word
‘competition’ is ‘competere’ in Latin and does not mean to
act against one another but means to search for something
together. Having competitors exchanging information
about their production costs is surely a thought-provoking
piece of information worth thinking about. The Cournot
game is a tool with an ability to draft the potential
situation of the market that is typically evaluated using the
triple bottom approach - especially in that case where the
sustainable development philosophy is one of the very few
possibilities of how to contend with low-cost competitors.
This paper offers clear guidance on the determination of
Table 2 Final subgame perfect equilibrium
q1 = 1,065 q3 = 1,638 q4 = 1,182
q9 = 1,057 q10 = 1,409 q11 = 659
Italics refers to PintInox, S. p. A. data.
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Responsibility policy concepts. The guidance given assists
company managements in the determination of the salable
quantities of their production. In other words, the Cournot
game represents a method to preserve the natural resources
(amounts that are not needed would not be produced). In
Figure 4, the sold quantity is compared to a weekly produc-
tion program. From this figure, it can be concluded that a
company's management could reconsider their production
program. During a 1-week observation of a production line,
the company manufactured 11,840 pieces (forks) whilst the
sold amount, according to the Cournot game results,
totalled 1,638 pieces. Which means that 10,202 pieces
would not be sold, i.e., considered for the market.
Stainless steel used to produce this unsold quantity
caused an environmental impact of 4,682,718 m2 of
consumed earth surface. If there are no additional
markets where the excess amounts could be sold or if
there is no potential to discover new markets for this
surplus production, then (based on the Cournot game
information about saleable quantities) management
should reassess the volumes produced daily. Management
should assume a smaller number of daily production
quantities and to ‘play’ the Cournot game once again with
lowered amounts of production. Using various scenarios,
management would be able to prepare more alternatives
(each with different input data) in order to determine a
more sustainable production program. A simulation of the
market situation by ‘playing’ the Cournot game would
assist management in preparing a more sustainable
production program. This means that a decrease of unsoldFigure 4 Production versus ability to sell the production.quantities would be accompanied by a lower footprint.
Excessive amounts of production are common phe-
nomena, as witnessed during the post-Christmas period
(‘Day-After-Christmas-Sales’) when huge amounts of
unsold products are sold undervalue. The Cournot game
represents the economic side of the triple bottom line
(TBL) reporting. The Cournot game is therefore an
integral part of sustainability measurement metrics.
Some large companies have already discovered situations
in which economy and ecology strive to reach the same
goal - to consume fewer resources. It is cheaper if it
preserves natural resources (e.g., the hotels encourage
customers to reuse their towels). There are more basic
incentives that drive companies towards the application
of sustainability measurement metrics as the main compo-
nent of their marketing strategy:
 Differentiation strategy - a need to compete against
low-cost competitors;
 The image - creating an image of a responsible com-
pany, especially when serving the high-end customer
segment;
 A need to fulfill requirements valid at new emerging
markets placing value on sustainability; and
 Cases when the economy and ecology have the
same goal.
In summary, the bonus for companies that offer
eco-innovations is a gained ability to utilize an opportunity
to enter new prospective markets based on principles of
sustainable development. This paper did not have an
ambition to present a detailed way of identifying eco-
innovations by using sustainability measurement metrics.
We had concentrated on the consecutive steps in the life
cycle assessment - the identification of success/failure of an
eco-innovation by using the Cournot game. The Cournot
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The Cournot game measures the competitiveness of com-
panies using their CSR policy concepts and the salable
quantities of their eco-innovated products.
Conclusions
In this study, the application of the game theory is a
reaction to the current needs of companies, which have
already applied sustainability measurement metrics. The
Cournot game has a strong economic dimension, as this
type of economic analysis not only derives the quadratic
cost functions of competitors (using regression analysis)
but also calculates the market demand and the residual
market demand. In addition, it mathematically verifies
the allowable production outputs and tests to find out
which of the competitors cannot enter or reenter the
market. The study expects the existence of market princi-
ples applying value to sustainable development. In the
presented example, the SMEs had to present their com-
mitment to society and the environment in order to access
the market created by the Accor hotel chain. After admis-
sion to this market (based upon the presentation of a
verifiable sustainability measurement metrics using life
cycle assessment), the admitted companies form a natural
oligopoly with entrance barriers for low-cost competitors
and in this case become competitive with one another. In
this oligopoly, economic feasibility plays a decisive role as
has been evidenced by the Cournot game example. This
fact reconfirms the correctness of the triple bottom line
concept - environmental safety, social responsibility, and
economic effectiveness play equally important roles. We
do not only draw the attention of managers to the fact
that Corporate Social Responsibility does have a business
potential but also introduce the very complex economic
part of TBL (enabling companies to fully embrace the
opportunities being offered by sustainable development).
The Cournot game enables the company to think in
competitiveness dimensions instead of in simple cost
dimensions and delivers results utilizable in, for example,
break-even point analysis. The final outcome from using
the Cournot game is the ability to identify a sustainable sys-
tem - which is in this case an amount of production fitted
to the market needs (i.e., the salable quantities). Company
managements receive a tool which protects them from
overproduction. The Cournot game helps to diminish the
difference between both the produced/overproduced and
sold amounts. Hence, this would be the best application of
the Cournot game in order to protect natural resources.
From an ecological point of view, the preservation of
resources means less deviation from natural cycles and
from an economic point of view; it means less variable
costs, less storage costs and in some cases less transporta-
tion costs. As ecological economics is a cross-discipline, we
have combined the economic tool (game theory) for theevaluation of economic issues with the ecological footprint
used for the evaluation of environmental dimensions in this
paper. This study was prepared as a reaction to a wide gap
perceived in sustainable development research in a phase of
commercialization. An integration of technical and eco-
nomical assessment is needed but rare. From those few
studies containing an integrative assessment, the economic
dimension of integrative studies is generally aimed at feasi-
bility studies, analysis of world prices, cost benefit analysis
(CBA), payback period, capital and operating cost analysis,
or capital expenditures (CAPEX) analysis. However, rigor-
ous studies of the implementation phase accompanied by
market situation analyses are critically missing. The imple-
mentation and commercialization is in fact a decisive step
in the life cycle of a product. The sustainable development
initiatives strive for commercialization; otherwise, the phil-
osophy of ‘being sustainable’ and ‘behaving responsibly’ can
hardly be widespread. The presented paper is devoted to an
analysis of the market, as selling to the end customer is in
our opinion the most critical phase of the life cycle of a
product which determines its success or failure. The use of
a game theory is greatly underestimated by the current sus-
tainability science. In this study, the Cournot game has a role
to preserve material and energy resources. Companies limit-
ing overproduction will directly contribute to a better future
for generations to come. In this paper, it has been stated that
companies cooperate within a competitive oligopoly. As
mentioned, to compete (‘competere’) in Latin means to work
on something together. A real market interaction within an
oligopoly is based on economic effectiveness which is repre-
sented by the production costs. More accurate information
about shared costs can be more precisely predicted by re-
garding the reality (the market space acquired by every com-
petitor) in their practice. In other words, cooperation may
assist them to better predict the real market situation and to
prepare themselves for this goal.Endnotes
awww.math.harvard.edu/~elkies/FS23j.03/zermelo.pdf,
accessed 12. Feb. 2015.
bhttp://cruel.org/econthought/profiles/cournot.html,
accessed 12. Feb. 2015.
cwww.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/
laureates/2012/popular-economicsciences2012.pdf,
accessed 12. Feb. 2015.
dhttp://homepage.stat.uiowa.edu/~jcryer/22s008/Lecture
%20Notes/chap8.PDF, accessed 12. Feb. 2015.Additional files
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